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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 330 
Accident time: 11:40 Accident Date: 18/11/2000 
Where it occurred: MNB West, Dakovica, 
Koshare West 
Country: Kosovo 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 22/11/2000 
ID original source: MD/CC/JF Name of source: KMACC 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMA-3 AP blast Ground condition: rocks/stones 
woodland (light) 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 20/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 3 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: GR DN 3511 0148 Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
inappropriate vegetation cutting tool (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
use of pick (?) 
incomplete detonation (?) 




The following is the Accident report made by the Kosovo MACC, edited for anonymity. Excess 
pictures have also been removed. (See also the demining group’s internal accident report 
under Related papers.) 
 
Introduction 
1. In accordance with MACC Standard Working Procedure #4, the MACC Programme 
Manager issued a Convening Order for an accident investigation Board of Inquiry (a copy of 
the Convening Order is attached at Annex A).  
2. This is a comprehensive report by the Board of Inquiry on the mine accident that occurred 
on Saturday 18th November 2000.  
3. Based on the results of the investigation, the statements from the personnel involved in the 
accident (see attached statements in Annex B appendix 1 to 8), visits to the accident site and 
photos from the accident site, this accident can be considered as a preventable mine 
accident. This finding is further qualified by the fact that the accident was caused by non-
adherence to [the Demining  group]’s approved Standard Operating Procedures. 
4. The information provided by the [Demining  group] to the MACC in the “Incident Report” is 
confirmed. However the BOI does not concur with some of the [Demining  group]’s findings 
regarding the contributory factors to this accident. A copy of the “Incident Report” is attached 
as Annex C [see Related papers]. The accident occurred at approximately 11h40 on 
November 18th, 2000 in a minefield located near the village of Koshare GR DN 3511 0148. 
Mr. [the Victim] was in a squatting or kneeling position in front of his one-meter wide lane 
using his sapping tool to pull vegetation and incidentally activated a PMA-3 blast mine. The 
casualty suffered very minor blast trauma to both hands and lower parts of his legs. He was 
released from the Italian KFOR field hospital the next day. There were no other personnel 
injured in the accident or any witness and the property damage was only to the sapping tool.   
5. [The Victim] is a Deminer who has been working with [the Demining  group] since 
September 22nd 1999. He is an experienced deminer but considered “weak” and had 
previously been warned verbally by his Team Leader for not following the [Demining  group]’s 
SOPs.  
6. The MACC task dossier number in that area is W02-37. The location that the deminer had 
the accident is in a row of mines that are part of a two-row mine pattern adjacent to a water 
stream. The pattern is similar to the other minefields in the task dossier. 
 
Sequence, Documentation and Procedure of Tasking 
7. [The Demining  group] started working on this minefield on 20th of July 2000, and have 
cleared 6277 sq metres of land and located and destroyed 174 anti-personnel mines. These 
mines were PMA-3 blast and PMR-2A fragmentation mines. The VJ records indicate that over 
two thousand AP mines were laid in the area and many of the fragmentation mines were laid 
with blast mines as keepers around them. The lane in which the casualty was working had 
been excavated as it was not possible to use the Ebinger H detector due to soil interference.  
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[The picture above shows the accident site. the visor was the victim’s. It is some metres from 
the “adjacent stream”.] 
 
Geography and Weather 
8. The task site is located close to the village of Koshare in a mountainous region on the west 
border with Albania where [the Demining  group] is currently working on four manual tasks. 
Access to the site is by the dirt road across mountaineering ground. The weather was cloudy 
and the ground was damp due to rain before the accident. The temperature was 
approximately 10 to 12 Celsius. The vegetation is semi dense and there are a lot of dead 
trees. The soil is a mix of rocky, soft muddy ground.  
 
Site Layout and Marking 
9. The site layout and marking was in accordance with the [the Demining  group]’s SOPs. The 
area is marked with small red top pickets every one meter and 1-meter picket every 5 meters.  
 
Management Supervision and Discipline 
10. [TL] was the Team Leader in charge of the site on the day of the accident. The immediate 
supervisor of [the Victim] was his Section Commander who had visited him 25 minutes before 
the accident and noted that he was working in accordance with the [Demining  group]’s SOPs. 
11. The [Demining  group] has two different ways of conducting minefield clearance: 
The first technique is the one-man one lane (OMOL) drill where a single deminer is working in 
each clearance lane for a period of 30 minutes with 10 minutes break in between. 
The second technique is two men one lane (TMOL) drill, where each pair of deminers is 
responsible for one clearance lane. Each deminer alternately spends half an hour demining 
and then half an hour observing his partner at work from a 25 meters distance. 
12. The technique used on the day of the accident was the OMOL drill and supervised by the 
Section Commander who is directly responsible for the control of the deminers in his section. 
 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control 
13. [The Demining  group] internal Quality Control and Quality Assurance is obtained through 
a system of adherence to [the Demining  group]’s SOPs, an international or local Demining 
Supervisor on site, training standards and very strict discipline in the danger area. 
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14. External Quality Assurance is conducted by regular MACC QA visits. So far, a total of 12 
QA Evaluations visits have been conducted at this site. Three of these visits had to be 
cancelled due to rain. In general the Evaluation reports were good.  
 
Communications and Reporting 
15. Communications on each of the [Demining  group] task sites is provided by VHF hand 
held and VHF and HF vehicle mounted radios. In accordance with [the Demining  group] 
SOP, no clearance operations are to be performed without effective communications. On the 
day of the accident, the mine/UXO clearance team had proper and appropriate 
communications on site.   
 
Medical Details 
16. [The Victim] was removing vegetation with the help of the sapping tool, when he activated 
a PMA-3 blast mine. He then walked down his safe lane back to the main track and attempted 
to wash his injured hand in a rainwater puddle. By that time the Section Commander, who 
was in the adjacent lane at the time of the explosion, met with the casualty and stopped him 
from washing is hand. The Team Medic, who was at the satellite medical point was with the 
casualty in less then 2 minutes and gave immediate treatment (see Annex: D for details).  
17. The ambulance with the other two Team Medics was sent to the accident site by the 
Team Leader. They reached the casualty in 4 minutes and gave assistance. The casualty 
was conscious but in shock. The Team Leader informed the [Demining  group] base in 
Dubrava who requested and co-ordinated MEDEVAC with the Italian KFOR. Request for a 
helicopter was done and the casualty was transported in the standard [Demining  group] 
ambulance to the HLS located approximately 600m from the accident site. 
18. At approximately 12h40, the helicopter landed at the HLS. The casualty was loaded and 
flew directly to the Italian KFOR field hospital. The casualty arrived at the Italian KFOR field 
hospital at12h50. The Doctor on duty immediately assessed him. No surgical procedures 
were required and he was kept for observation overnight night and released the next day (see 




19. A list of the team personnel, and their duties, is attached at Annex B. A written draft of the 
[Demining  group] Internal minefield Accident Report from the [Demining  group] Manual 
Demining Supervisor and the statements from the personnel that assisted in the CASEVAC 
are attached as appendices to Annex B.  
 
Dress and Personal Protective Equipment  
20. At the time of the accident, [the Victim] was wearing personnel protective equipment 
according to the [Demining  group]’s SOPs. No significant damages were found on the 
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personnel protective equipment.  [Photographs showed that the PPE was a long visor and a 
short frontal vest.] 
 
Tools and Equipment  
21. There is convincing proof that at the time of the accident, [the Victim] was using the 
[Demining  group] standard sapping tool to drag/remove the vegetation in front of him.  
Mine blast damage on the handle of the sapping tool.  [What the demining group call a 
“Trowel” is shown below.] 
 
 
Details of Mine Involved and evidence of Minefield 
22. The mine was a PMA-3 anti-personnel blast mine. The evidence at the accident site 
confirms that the mine was surface laid and up side down. 
 
Account of Activities 
23. The following is the description of the events that led up to the accident. (The statements 
that were evaluated to describe the events are attached in Annex B as Appendixes 1 to 8): 
At 07h30, the team left the Dubrava compound.  
At 09h15, the team arrived to Koshare 1. 
At 09h30, work started. 
At 09h40, work stopped due to rain. 
At 09h55, start working again. 
At 11h15, the Team Leader moves [the Victim] to the new working clearance lane. 
At 11h40, uncontrolled detonation. 
At approximately one minute after the explosion, the Section Commander and the Medic at 
the satellite medical point got to the casualty. He received immediate treatment and the Team 
Leader calls the base in Dubrava.  
At 11h50 the casualty in ambulance and heading for the HLS. At the same time the 
MEDEVAC is requested to Italian KFOR. 
At 12h40, helicopter arrived to the HLS and loads the casualty. 
At 12h50, Casualty arrives at Italian KFOR field hospital. 
 
Insurance Details 
24. [The Victim] was covered by the standard [Demining  group] insurance cover for all 
personnel involve in mine/UXO clearance activities. All insurance policies for [Demining  






25. Based on this investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry 
conclude the following: 
• The procedure used by [the Victim] to remove the vegetation is not in accordance 
with the [Demining  group]’s SOP for “Removal of deadfall”. By doing this, he was 
putting at risk both the Deminer and the Section Commander in the adjacent lane 
30m away. He had been previously briefed by the Team Leader and his Section 
Commander on the types of mines found (PMR-2A and PMA-3). If he had initiated a 
PMR-2A, the consequence of his act would have resulted in far more casualties and 
possibly a fatality. 
• The Team Leader had previously warned [the Victim] verbally with regard to his 
disregard of [the Demining  group]’s SOPs. 
• The mine involved in the accident is the PMA-3 blast mine. The evidence at the 
accident site suggests that the mine was lying up side down on the ground surface. 
• The marking at the accident site was done in accordance with [the Demining  group]’s 
SOPs.  
• There is no witness to the accident.  
• The support from the Italian KFOR was very good. The Italian KFOR medical staff 
requested information by radio to be better prepared for the arrival of the casualty at 
the field hospital, this in no way detracted from the effectiveness of the Medevac.  
• The BOI does not agree with the statements in the [Demining  group] Accident report, 
regarding the inaccuracies of the VJ minefield. The minefield at the accident site had 
been identified and the pattern is standard and concurred with many of the other VJ 
minefield records in the same MACC task dossier.  
• The BOI, does not accept as valid the statement that the road journey and working 
hours were excessive. If this were valid, why was [the Demining  group] not operating 
from a field camp? In addition the deminers were working on a Saturday 
extraordinarily. 
• This accident was preventable. 
 
Recommendations 
26. The following are recommendations based on the Board of Inquiry conclusions: 
• It is recommended that [the Demining  group] Management take the appropriate 
disciplinary action against [the Victim]. 
• [The Demining  group] management must review their SOPs and re-write the chapter 
8 “Conducting of Clearance” then conduct refresher training. Until these two issues 
are resolved it is recommended that the [Demining  group] manual mine clearance 
operations are suspended. 
• [The Demining  group] Management must enforce their warning system mentioned in 
current SOPs under paragraph #13 title Discipline. 
• [The Demining  group] Management must provide better supervision with proper 
experience in all of their mine/UXO clearance sites, especially in complex task sites 
like Koshare.  
• [The Demining  group] Management must seriously consider a satellite field camp for 
mine/UXO clearance operations in the area of Koshare. 





A:  MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry 
B: List of personnel involved with attached statements as appendices.  
C: IMSMA Mine/UXO Accident Report   
D:  MACC QA Medical Officer “Medical Report” 
  
Comments by the Chief Operations Officer 
The [Demining  group] internal Accident Report quotes “Koshare is punishing and there is no 
room for errors”. If this is true why was an identified “weak” deminer deployed there without 
adequate supervision? 
The comments regarding the VJ records are both unnecessary and irrelevant. The deminer 
was in an existing breech lane moving forward into a known and visible row of mines. 
Based on the fact that identical recommendations have been made to [the Demining group] in 
the past with no significant action taken, I intend to withdraw the relevant accreditation for [the 
Demining group] to conduct manual mine clearance in Kosovo.  
I find the conclusions and recommendations of this report, both considered and valid. 
Signed: Chief of Operations  
 
Comments by the Programme Manager 
I concur with the findings and recommendations of the BOI. The major concern held is the 
lack of appropriate supervision at [the Demining group] manual mine clearance sites. Whilst 
this is in keeping with [the Demining group]’s philosophy for developing local capacities and 
promoting them rapidly into positions of responsibility, this approach has less relevance in the 
context of the Kosovo Mine Action Programme. 
Signed: Programme Manager 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 414 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available 
(insured) 
Time to hospital: 1 hour 10 minutes 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Long visor, Short 
frontal vest 
 









The demining group recorded the Victim’s injuries as: 
“Right hand - blast injuries, cuts and fragmentation from mine and dirt below skin. 
Left hand - similar but less serious than right hand. 
 
Left leg - small burn below knee. 
Right leg - minor injuries below knee”. 
 
The UN MACC medical report 
This report was included as Annex: D in the accident report. 
Investigation report, medical, from the accident 18th November 2000 in Kosare 1 minefield. 
 
Introduction  
This report is based on the accident report by Manual Demining Supervisor, [Demining 
group]. The statements and interviews with Medic (1), Medic (2), Medic (3), and Italian KFOR 
[Doctor]; interview with the casualty; the documentation, accident chart, from the Medics and 
my own observations from the site of the accident.  
 
Summary 
[The victim] was removing vegetation from the ground to front his lane in a squat position, 
when he hit a PMA 3 Mine. After the accident he walked down the safe lane, which is a steep 
hill, to the track where he was met by the Section Commander and another deminer. [The 
Victim] tried to put his injured hands into a puddle of water but was interrupted and escorted 
to the improvised medic point.  
At the time of the accident medic 1, with the medical trauma injury kit, was located at the 
improvised medic point, within one minute from the casualty. At 11:40 hrs medic 1 heard the 
detonation and the whistling signal. She immediately started to prepare field dressing and 
infusion. The medic started to assess [the Victim’s] condition, which was stabile. The casualty 
was conscious, but shocked and had therefore difficulties with taking deep breaths. The 
bleeding was not assessed as extensive. Medic 1 started to clean the wounds on both hands 
and put field dressing and immobilized the right hand. 
The two other above-mentioned medics, who were stationed at the control point, got the 
information directly about the accident by Motorola. They went momentarily with the 
emergency vehicle, driver included, to the satellite medical point, preparing the medical 
trauma injury kit in the meantime. They arrived within 4 minutes and assisted Medic 1 to 
assess and treat the casualty. The medics took off the apron in order to check the breast 
followed by taking off the trousers.  Sterile dressings, immobilization, were applied to the left 
hand. The minor injuries bellow the left knee got the same treatment as the hands. An 
intravenous cannula was applied and the casualty received infusion, one dose of analgesic 
drug iv and Oxygen. Before transportation by road to the HLS the medics did a recheck of 
[his] condition. The medics recorded the treatment that had been given on their accident 
chart, which followed the casualty. 
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At 11:50 hrs the stabilized casualty was waiting, in the [Demining group] ambulance, on the 
HLS. After approx. 50 minutes the Italian KFOR helicopter arrives. [The Victim]’s condition 
was stabile during the whole procedure. [The] Team Leader, two medics and one deminer, 
with the same blood group, followed the casualty during the MEDEVAC.  
At 12:50 hrs the casualty arrives at the Military Hospital in Peja and Dr. [Name] immediately 
assessed [the Victim]. Diagnose: Multiple superficial wounds on both hands and left leg. 
Treatment: X-ray of both hands and left knee/leg. Ultrasound scan of abdomen. There was no 
evidence of bone fractures or fluid on the spleen. No surgical procedures were carried out. 
The casualty was dismissed to his home the following day and is followed-up by Italian KFOR 
Hospital with wound care of the hands. 
Undersigned visited the casualty in his home. He means that the medical treatment that he 
received in the acute phase was very good. 
  
Conclusions 
The Medical staff performed in accordance to the [Demining group]’s SOP. [The Victim] 
received medical treatment momentarily because of the proximity of the medical point. 
[The Victim] is satisfied with the received medical care. It should be mentioned that the 
casualty is not completely satisfied with the support from the organization e.g. no official 
representative has talked with him after the accident. 
Even though evacuation by road could be enough due to the injuries. The decision that was 
made to evacuate by air was good because the hard terrain and that the casualty’s condition 
was difficult to diagnose under those tough circumstances. 
It took the helicopter 0:50 hrs to arrive from the time the message was sent to Italian KFOR. 
The staff, who were in contact by radio with Italian KFOR, experienced that there were too 
many questions asked in the acute situation. It should be remembered that sometimes more 
detailed questions is of importance for making the decision if evacuation by air is necessary 
and to prepare for possible surgery. 
Overall MEDEVAC time was approx. 1:10 hrs. 
 
Recommendations 
Psychological support and follow-up for the casualty. 
Debriefing for the staff, who were involved in the accident. 
Each organization should have a standardized MEDEVAC radio procedure form from KFOR. 
Signed: Medical Officer, 23rd November 2000 
  
In December 2001 the MACC reported that the Victim had fully recovered but had been 
dismissed for breaking SOPs in this accident. 
 
Analysis 
The Primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the demining group involved had not listened to the MACC requirements following previous 
accidents, and the MACC felt it necessary to suspend their licence to operate.  
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the tool used by the 
demining group was inappropriate. Euphemistically described as a “trowel” by this group 
around the world, the tool is a hoe or a side-headed axe. Its wooden handle has frequently 
featured in injuries for this group.  
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The demining group’s management have failed to provide accident records for many 
countries, but this database includes records of their accidents while using the tool in Angola, 
Mozambique and Kosovo. 
There also appears to have been a significant failure of training and appropriate Field control. 
Large parts of the mine’s plastic case were recovered and are pictured below. The presence 
of most of the base implies that it was in the ground and so the mine was not upside-down (as 
the internal investigator speculated – see Related papers). 
 
As with most reports from the Kosovo MACC, the accident report demonstrates an unusually 
thorough and critical approach to accident investigation. The Mine Action Co-ordination 
Centre which carried out the investigation was not engaged in demining, and this may (in 
part) explain the unusually objective nature of their investigations 
 
Related papers 
These are the Annexes referenced in the MACC Accident report, followed by the demining 
group’s internal accident report. 
 
ANNEX A: MACC convening order for accident investigation Board of Inquiry – not in file. 
ANNEX B: List of personnel involved with attached statements as appendices – omitted for 
anonymity. 
ANNEX C: IMSMA Mine/UXO Accident Report – omitted for anonymity. 
ANNEX D: MACC QA Medical Officer “Medical Report” – see Victims tab and click on 
Medical report. 
 
Demining group Internal Accident report 
Minefield Accident - 18 November 2000 
 
1. General 
a. Location of Accident : Koshare 1 minefield - Kosovo, MNB West, Dakovica, Koshare West. 
b. 34T DN 35580 01550  
 
2. Background Information 
10 
The [Demining group] has been carrying out mine clearing operations in Kosovo since 
October 1999 and is currently working in MNB (multi-national brigade) Central and West 
regions. [The Demining group] commenced manual demining operations in Koshare village 
on 20 July 2000 and, to date, has cleared 6277 sq metres of land and located and destroyed 
174 anti-personnel mines. These mines were PMA-3 pressure blast and PMR-2A 
fragmentation stake mines. The Serb minefield records indicate that over two thousand AP 
mines were laid in the area and many of the fragmentation stake mines were laid with 
pressure blast mines (keepers) around them as an anti-clearance method.  
Koshare is situated in a mountainous region on the west border with Albania and [the 
Demining group]  are currently  working on four manual tasks there. Each task is commanded 
by a Team Leader who is qualified in EOD and each team comprises sections of up to five 
deminers who are supervised by a Section Commander. There is full medical support for all 
demining operations in the form of a Land Rover ambulance and at least two qualified 
paramedics at each site. There are also satellite medical points throughout the minefields. 
KFOR approved helicopter landing sites have also been built close to demining operations 
and in the MNB Central region, the Italian KFOR are on stand-by in the event of an 
emergency. 
The Koshare minefields are located high on the border with Albania and can be reached by 
tarmac road and dirt tracks by vehicle. Drive time from the [Demining group] base in Dubrava 
is 2 to 2 ½ hours and the stone/dirt track which winds its way up from Junik is both narrow 
and uneven and is normally used by local horse and carts and Albanians crossing to illegally 
cut wood. This means that by the end of a normal working day the deminers have not only 
worked for six hours in the minefield but have also had to endure a four to five hour 
uncomfortable journey in the back of a DAF truck. Koshare is an extremely difficult area in 
which to work and, although [the Demining group] is working from old Serb records in one 
area (Koshare 1), these have been found to be inaccurate with regards numbers of mines and 
their location. Other tasks which are higher up the mountain are in areas which were only 
accessible with the aid of a Case front loader which was used for safe recce and to breach 
into suspect areas in the hope of seeing or detonating an AP mine. Most of the terrain is 
covered in trees and bushes with numerous tracks and streams cutting through the dense 
vegetation. Mines have been laid on the slopes of hills, under trees, in bushes, on the sides of 
streams and along tracks. It is the most hazardous current [Demining group] manual task in 
Kosovo with the largest number of AP mines reported to have been laid. 
 
3. Accident Details 
On Saturday 18 November 2000 at 11:40 hrs (local time), a deminer in section 4, had an 
accident while working in Koshare1 minefield. The deminer had been removing vegetation 
from the ground to the front of his lane when he initiated a PMA-3 anti-personnel pressure 
blast mine.  
Note: The deminer has been employed by the [Demining group] since 22 September 1999 
after he successfully completed a [Demining group] demining training course. This was his 
second day working at this site and he had previously worked at Prilep and Babaj Bokes 
minefields, which are also in the MNB West region. 
At the time of the accident I was in Babaj Bokes minefield with the Dubrava Assistant 
Location Manager [ALS] and we were showing a dog handler from the [2nd demining group] 
the site. We heard on the VHF radio a conversation between the Koshare 1 Team Leader, 
and [Demining group] Dubrava that there had been a mine accident in Koshare 1 and that a 
deminer had initiated an AP mine resulting in injuries to both hands. After confirming this with 
Dubrava, [ALS] and myself drove to the accident site. I had already spoken by radio to [the] 
Dubrava Location Manager, informing him of my movements and that I would carry out an 
initial investigation of the accident. [Demining group] Dubrava had already informed the Italian 
KFOR and requested the helicopter to RED 26, the designated HLS at Koshare. As we 
arrived at Koshare 1 the helicopter was departing with the casualty, Team Leader and two 
medics to the Italian KFOR hospital in Peja. The accident lane had been closed and was 
guarded by a deminer and the remainders of the team were at the control point with the 
teams from Koshare 3, 4 and 5. After updating [Demining group] base of the situation I spoke 
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briefly with the injured deminer’s Section Commander before he took me to the closed lane. I 
then carried out an initial investigation of the accident site. 
 
4. Initial Investigation (Inspection of the Accident Site 18/11/00 at 12:15 hrs) 
I had been informed by the Section Commander that the mine had been initiated in the 
uncleared area and it was not a missed mine. The lane in which the deminer was working had 
been excavated as it was not possible to use the Ebinger H detector due to soil interference. 
After confirming this myself with a H detector I decided that it was safe to walk up to the site 
of the accident. 
Visual Inspection 
The area where the accident had occurred was to the left side (looking up from the track) of a 
steep two metre wide excavated lane leading from the main track and adjacent to a stream. 
The lane was rocky and steps had been cut out by deminers after excavating to a depth of 
twenty centimetres in order for them to walk safely. Vegetation (grass and bushes) had been 
removed during the demining process and there was a bundle in the lane surrounded by four 
blue painted wooden sticks indicating a contamination pit (as per SOPs). A number of yellow 
painted wooden sticks had been placed at intervals along the lane marking where PMA-3 and 
PMR-2A AP mines had been found and destroyed. 
The site of the accident was at 16 ½ metres up from the main track and on the left side of the 
lane. A two metre by 50 centimetre area had been recently excavated and marked to the left 
of the lane and was to the side of where the deminer had been working when the accident 
occurred. The lane had been marked correctly with wooden 50cm red painted sticks at 1 
metre intervals marking the border of the clear/unclear area. A visor and long-handled trowel 
could be seen in the uncleared area at 20cm to the front and in the centre of the two red 
sticks where the deminer had been working. To the left side of the visor was a 2m long  tree 
log which was laying parallel with the lane. A 30cm x 30cm trench had been excavated to a 
depth of 12cm (12cm is minimum depth of excavation in new SOPs) to the left of and behind 
the front of lane (safe area). This excavation was a continuation of the 2 metre excavation 
and formed part of a step. To the front of the lane the ground was covered with very short 
grass and there was no evidence of excavation. A small bare patch of grass was visible 
behind the trowel (approx. 40cm from the front of lane) and the end of the log, close to where 
the visor was lying, seemed to be charred. No crater could be seen and a few small pieces of 
green plastic and small amounts of explosive were beneath the visor/trowel. A plastic base 
plate from a PMA-3 was found at two metres to the left of the accident site and outside the 
red sticks. At two metres above and to the right of the accident site was the bundle of 
sticks/brush. The deminer’s detector and tool bag were two metres bellow where he had been 
working.   
 
5. Physical Evidence 
Tools 
Long-handled trowel - this is used by the deminer for shaving the ground during the 
excavation process. The trowel has a metal trowel/hammer head and a wooden shaft: 
The centre of the wooden shaft had black/grey scorch marks and was broken at the centre 
although, not completely severed. 
 
Protective Clothing 
Ballistic visor - One small pit mark at the top centre on the outside of the lens. A small black 
powder mark on the outside bottom centre. No markings on the inside of the lens and no 
further damage to the lens or band.   
Body Armour - Small amount of pitting on the front top and some blood on its front and on the 
front of flap. 
 
12 
6. Further Investigation (Koshare 18/11/00 at 13:00 hrs) 
The following people were interviewed by myself at Koshare 1 control point after the initial 
investigation of the accident site:  
Section Commander, Section 4, Team 2 
[The Victim] had been moved from another lane by the Team Leader earlier in the day to the 
lane where the accident occurred. He was told by the Team Leader to widen the left side of 
the two metre wide lane in order to make it safer to walk past the contamination pit containing 
the sticks/brush. [The Team Leader] had last checked the deminer at 11:10 hrs and the 
deminer was working safely and excavating with his trowel at a depth of twelve centimetres 
across his one metre wide lane and out to the left side of the two metre lane. He had already 
cleared one metre wide and out to fifty centimetres and was on his second metre (next to 
accident site). After excavating the deminer was cutting steps to connect with existing steps 
made previously by deminers. The deminer had marked his lane as per SOPs and was 
wearing his blast gear correctly.   
[The Section Commander] was approximately thirty metres away in a lane on the opposite 
side of the stream and heard the explosion at 11:40 hrs. He immediately blew his whistle 
three times and shouted to his deminers to stop work, close their lanes and come out of the 
minefield. He spoke to the Team Leader by radio confirming that there had been an 
uncontrolled explosion. The injured deminer walked down the lane to the track where he was 
met by [the Section Commander] another deminer. The injured deminer tried to put his injured 
hands into a puddle of water but [was] stopped and escorted to the satellite medic point, fifty 
metres along the track. A medic had been positioned there prior to commencing work and 
started to carry out first aid. Within four minutes the ambulance with Team Leader and two 
medics arrived from the control point to carry out further medical aid. The only comments that 
the casualty had made were that he had pain in his hands. 
 
1st Deminer Section 4, Team 2 
At the time of the accident he was working thirty to forty metres above the casualty in the 
same lane. After the explosion he heard the Section Commander shout that there had been 
an accident. He then saw the casualty walk out of the lane to the track. He then closed his 
lane and took his equipment with him to the track. He walked to the satellite medic point and 
saw that the casualty was receiving first aid.  
 
2nd Deminer Section 4, Team 2 
He was working in a lane across the stream and approximately thirty metres away from the 
accident site. At the time of the explosion the Section Commander was checking him and 
therefore went with him to assist. He confirms that the Section Commander prevented the 
casualty from placing his hands in the puddle and at the satellite medic point he and the 
Section Commander assisted the medic. 
 
Medic at improvised medic point 
Shortly after hearing the explosion the casualty was brought to the medic point by the Section 
Commander. She looked at the casualty’s injuries and started dressing the right hand. Within 
minutes the ambulance arrived and the two other medics assisted. The left hand was dressed 
and a wound on the left leg (bellow the knee was bandaged). The casualty was administered 
10ml of Nubain painkilling drug and an intravenous was set up with 500ml of Gelofusine 
solution. The casualty was placed in the ambulance and driven to designated point near the 
HLS to await the helicopter. 
 
Team Leader, Team 2 
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(After the investigation in Koshare I interviewed the Team Leader in Junik 18/11/00 at 15:30 
hrs on his return from the Italian KFOR hospital in Peja.) 
[The Team Leader] said that [the Victim] is a very weak deminer and that he had previously 
worked with him in Prilep and Babaj Bokes and had warned him on a number of occasions for 
not carrying out correct demining procedures and wearing his visor unsafely. [The Victim] had 
first come to work in Koshare on 17 November and [the Team Leader] warned him that 
Koshare was a difficult and dangerous task and that he must follow [Demining group] SOPs. 
On the day of the accident [the Team Leader] had instructed the Section Commander to 
move [the Victim] in order to widen the lane adjacent to the stream, as his current lane was 
getting too close to another working lane. He did not see the deminer working after he was 
moved. The explosion took place at 11:40 hrs and prior to that [the Team Leader] had been 
preparing the firing cable in an area where three mines had been found, approximately 400 
metres from the accident site. After realising where the detonation had taken place he called 
by radio to the Section Commander in order to find out what had happened. He then stopped 
all work in the minefield and went with ambulance to the satellite medic point. He attempted to 
call [the Demining group] base by Codan while in the ambulance but was unsuccessful. After 
seeing that the casualty was being treated by the medics he was able to get through on the 
Codan and inform [the] base of the accident and give all the necessary details. 
The helicopter arrived at RED 26 just before 12:40 and [the Team Leader] went with the 
casualty and two medics to Peja hospital. During the flight a further 500ml of Gelofusine was 
administered. When [name excised] left the hospital, the casualty was in a satisfactory 
condition. He had only received minor injuries from the blast.  
 
The Victim 
(After visiting his family, the casualty was interviewed at the Italian KFOR hospital Peja 
18/11/00 at 19:15 hrs by myself and [name excised].) 
Earlier in the day he had been moved from another lane in order to widen the lane near the 
stream. He was working in the squat position and was reaching over the front of his lane with 
his right hand and was pulling a small branch of a tree which was lying on the ground. As he 
pulled the branch he must have somehow initiated the mine. 
 
7. Physical Evidence  
Injuries to Deminer 
Right hand - blast injuries, cuts and fragmentation from mine and dirt below skin. 
Left hand - similar but less serious than right hand. 
Left leg - small burn bellow knee. 
Right leg - minor injuries bellow knee. 
 
8. Summary of Investigation 
The Team Leader said that [the Victim] was a “weak deminer” and had a history of verbal 
warnings for not following correct SOPs. The area where he was working at the time of the 
accident was very difficult to excavate as it was uphill and covered in bushes and rocks. Prior 
to the accident [the Victim] had been visited by the Section Commander who had seen him 
carrying out excavation correctly. It was not possible to use detectors safely in this type of 
terrain and the soil is ferrous and therefore not suitable for the H detector. PMA-3 and PMR-
2A AP mines had already been found in the lane and therefore great care and cautiousness 
had to be taken when working there. 
 
9. Conclusions of Accident 
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From the visual inspection carried out during the initial investigation and the physical evidence 
the following can be concluded : 
There was no evidence of excavation to the front of the lane and the long-handled trowel was 
lying 20cm to the front which would indicate that although the casualty said that he had been 
pulling a branch with his hand when the mine was initiated, the damage to the trowel and its 
location, would indicate that it had struck the mine or forced something onto the mine. Due to 
its design (pressure plate tilts) the PMA-3 can be easily initiated. It is likely that the deminer 
had been removing vegetation from the surface of the ground by raking or pulling with the 
trowel which was held in his right hand. After this he would have undoubtedly carried out 
excavation as he had done previously. There was no crater left after the blast and only a bare 
patch in the grass at approximately 40cm to the front of lane. This would indicate that the 
mine was on the surface or possibly upside down and possibly covered with vegetation and 
not visible to the deminer. 
It can be concluded from the minor injuries to the deminer and the location of these injuries 
that he had been in the squat/half squat position and that the right hand had been closest to 
the mine. The visor and body armour had been worn correctly.  
Deminers have only been taught to use the trowel for excavating the ground in a shaving 
motion working from side to side and not downwards. The trowel should not be used to 
scrape the surface of the ground or pull vegetation especially as trip wires have been found in 
the area and some PMA-2 AP mines, which have been found in other areas of Koshare, have 
a plunger which usually stands above the surface. [The Victim] had been warned by the Team 
Leader about his work on a number of occasions and this was only his second day in this 
difficult minefield. Although the minefields he had worked in prior to Koshare had been mixed 
AP/AT, they had been mapped accurately (Serb records) and as well as being able to pretty 
much guarantee where the mines were laid, the terrain was far less challenging. Koshare is 
punishing and there is no room for errors and therefore speed of clearance has to be 
balanced with cautiousness. He was working carelessly and unsafe and has been extremely 
lucky to escape with only minor injuries. 
 
10. Casualty Evacuation 
The casualty was treated within minutes from the time of the accident. This was due to the 
close proximity of the satellite medic point, the actions of the Section Commander and the fact 
that the deminer walked out of the lane (probably in shock) himself. The ambulance with 
Team Leader and two other medics arrived from the control point within minutes and all 
medics performed well. The medics have carried out numerous minefield accident exercises, 
especially in Koshare, which have included the use of the Italian KFOR helicopter.  
It took the helicopter nearly one hour to arrive from the time the message was sent to the 
Italian KFOR in Peja and, there was much confusion and misunderstanding by the Italian 
radio operator while he reeled off his list of one thousand and one stupid questions to ask in 
the event of an emergency. Despite this when the helicopter did eventually arrive the casualty 
was evacuated swiftly to Peja.   
The casualty was given the following medicines and treatment by medics prior to evacuation 
to hospital : 
10 ml Nubain intravenous. 
500 ml Gelofusine. 
Dressings to right hand, left hand, right leg, left leg. 
 
11. Further action 
The casualty should be released from hospital on 20 November and will continue his recovery 
at home. UNMACC are carrying out their own investigations on 19 November. 
 
12. Future Recommendations 
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Ensuring that when staff are given warnings, especially in the minefield, that these are 
recorded properly and staff are dismissed at the appropriate times. 
As usual - Supervision. Although good supervision is taking place in the minefields there is 
always room for improvement and, it must be more vigilant in these difficult and hazardous 
areas. In the case of Koshare, this had already been identified and there had been an 
increase in supervision with senior staff spending more time there.  
Satellite medical points where possible in all minefields. This has been further increased in 
Kosovo since the [name excised] visit. 
As far as [the Victim] is concerned, after he has fully recovered, recommendation that he is 
dismissed. 
 
13.  Attachments 
           Annex 1 - Operations Log  
           Annex 2 - Sketch map of accident site        
           Annex 3 - photographs of accident site  
 
Report compiled by: Manual Demining Supervisor, The [Demining group], Kosovo. 
Dated: 19 November 2000. 
  
Statements 
Other statements are included in the body of the Demining group’s internal accident report 
under Related papers.  
 
The Victim 
Statement taken by MACC Assistant QA Officer and MACC Medical QA Officer. 
I was clearing my lane and wanted to remove a branch in from of my way so I could go 
forward, as I pool the branch and the explosion happen. 
After that I walk at the bottom of my clearance lane to the main track on my way to the 
medical satellite point I stopped and I put my hands on the water because I fill a kind of 
burning on my hands. One of the deminers I can’t remember who took me and we walk 
together to the medical point. 
At the medical point a medic she started the treatment cleaning my hands, and in a short time 
the other medics arrived. 
We wait for the helicopter at HLS approximately 50 minutes and they arrived took me and to 
other medics to the KFOR field hospital. 
Q1: What equipment you were using? 
A1: I start excavating and on my hand I had a sapping tool but I’m not sure if I had a sapping 
tool on my hands at the time of the accident, also I state that during clearance that day I was 
using the detector and the prodder. 
Q2: Did you use the detector all the time before the accident happened? 
A2: Yes I can say that everywhere where I step I cheeked before with detector. 
Q3: You where tired that day? 
A3: No I was not tired. 
 
Medic: Date 19.11.2000 
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We were sitting in the control point myself, another medic and the ambulance driver. When 
through Motorola we hear that there had been an accident. Immediately driver starts the 
ambulance and Team Leader told as that we have accident and the time was 11.40. 
For one minute we went to the control point in that place were the accident was happen. Over 
that time I was preparing trauma kit I wore the gloves, I prepare 2 compressive and elastic 
bandages and gene fusion, the Team Leader was trying to contact the compound to inform 
them about the accident. When we arrived we saw another medic Raze who was immobilising 
the casualties right hand. The casualty was conscious, then another medic and I checked his 
airways and he was good.  We took off the apron and check his chest he was good and after 
that we took off his trousers and he’s got three holes under the knee, I immobilised his leg 
and another medic immobilised his hand. After that we put a canella in him, the time was time 
was 11.44. 
 When the casualty in the ambulance we started going to the helicopter point we put him 
oxygen and all the time we was checking his situation which he’s felling big pain in his hands. 
Another medic gave to him one Nubian from 10mg. Because he was felling pain in his hands.  
After the helicopter arrived, Team Leader, I and another medic also one deminer with same 
bloods group we go in the helicopter and we start going in the way to Peja for 5 or 7 minutes 
we arrived in KFOR Peja hospital, all the time we was with him after that he was felling better 
and we start coming to Dubrava Location. 
 
Team Leader: Date 19.11.2000 
We start working at 9.30. 
10.00. Break  
10.10. Second Shift  
10.20. We stopped working  
10.35. We start third shift. 
11.05. Break  
11.15. We start fourth shift 
11.40.  I heard a strong detonation towards the end of the minefield, immediately, I called the 
Section Commander by radio.  He told me that there had been an accident.  I order all work to 
stop and informed the medics. They arrived with ambulance to the helicopter point. We left to 
the place were the accident happened. 
The medics came to give first aid, I contacted [Demining group] Dubrava to pass all 
information related to the accident. 
 
S .Commander: Date 19.11.2000 
It was working time and I told [the Victim] to widen the lane for 20 cm I think it was 11.15 
when I visit him he was working after that I go to check another deminers I was in [another] 
lane when the accident happen I heard a detonation accident was happened in the 11.40. I 
saw that [the Victim] has a accident and I blow the whistle and I told to deminers to close 
lanes, and go out the minefield. [Excised] asked me what is happening I told him we have a 
accident, after that I get the [the Victim] out the lane and I took the casualty in the control 
point. [A medic] offer him a first aid, when the ambulance arrived and they send him to the 
helicopter point after that I closed [the Victim]’s lane I call all deminers and we left to the 
control point. 
 
Medic 1: Date 19.11.2000 
We were sitting to the control point when through Motorola heard that we have a accident. 
Immediately driver stared ambulance and team leader call as to go cause we have a accident 
time was 11.40min. We were with him to the helicopter point. For one minute we went to the 
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control point in that place were the accident was happen. Over that time [medic] he open the 
trauma kit and he prepared the 2 compressive and elastic bandages and gene fusion, Team 
Leader was trying to contact with compound to informed them about the accident. When we 
arrived we saw another medic who was immobilising the casualties right hand. The casualty 
was conscious.  We took off the apron and check his chest he was good and after that we 
took off his trousers and he’s got three hols under the knee, I immobilised his hand and 
another medic immobilised his leg. [Excised] took off his boots and I saw that he’s got injuries 
under the knee he cleaned him a wound and he put him a elastic bandage after that I put a 
canella the time was 11.44minutes.  We get casualty in the ambulance we put him oxygen 
about 11.44 min we was to the helicopter point. All the time we were controlling his situation, 
but he was felling the pain in hands. After that I give one Nubian from 10mg. After that he was 
felling better but still he’s got the pain to the hands. About 12.40min after the helicopter 
arrived Team Leader, I and another medic also one deminer with same bloods group we go in 
the helicopter and we start going in the way to Peja. After 5 or 7min we were in Peja. 
There we get the casualty out the helicopter and we sent him in the hospital with their 
ambulance and after that in hospital doctors and medics took him inside, we was with him all 
the time. He was felling better and we decide to come in Dubrava. 
 
Deminer:  Date 19.11.2000 
I was working when I heard a detonation, the section commander was checking my lane. 
After he heard a detonation, he blow the whistle and asked us to close our lanes. I close my 
lane and I was walking when I saw [the Victim], he wanted to put hands in the water but the 
section commander didn’t let him. After that [the Section Commander] asked me to help the 
medic and I help her.  
 
Deminer: Date 19.11.2000 
I was working when I heard a detonation and I now that we have a accident I heard a whistle, 
the section commander informed us about an accident, and I saw [the Victim] walking down, I 
closed my lane and I took my bag of equipment.  I went down to the road when the 
ambulance was coming and they left. The casualty was conscious, I checked his airways and 
he was good  
 
Medic 2:   Date 19.11.2000 
About the first aid given to [the Victim] on Saturday November the 18th. At the moment I 
heard the blow and the whistle whistling three times I opened the major trauma Kit and began 
preparing the field bandage and giving set for infusion. Then, on arriving the casualty I offered 
him the first aid. I checked the airways and his conscience. Everything was OK so I 
immediately cleaned the wound in the both hands with povidone iodine solution and tied the 
wound in right hand with field bandage. Minutes later the Ambulance arrived with two another 
medics in it. Then we went on with the casualty’s left hand and right leg. Then we put the 
canella in and started giving the fluids including 10 mg of Nubian, and put the casualty in the 
ambulance, put the oxygen on and did the rechecking of the casualty in order to make sure of 
any existing complications. 
On arriving the Helicopter we put the casualty in and left to the Peja KFOR Hospital.     
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